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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC.,
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD,

DISTRICT COURT
CASE NO. 226426
SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 15018

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in tort, alleging negligence of
the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad in the collision of a truck
against the side of a moving train occupying a highway grade
crossing.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the close of the evidence, the court directed a
verdict in favor of respondent.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal and remand to the
District Court, on the sole ground there is a J'ury question whether the train sounded its whistle in accord with
the applicable statute.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of August 12, 1973, plaintiff
was a passenger in a truck driven East on 9000 South Street
in Salt Lake County, through the intersection of the rail·
road grade crossing at 412 West, into the side of a train
which was already occupying the crossing.

The railroad

crossing, and the approaches to it, are clearly marked wit:
devices painted on the pavement and signs posted on the
shoulder of the road 3 0 0 feet back from the crossing, with
a flashing light mounted on a post at the side of the eros:·
ing, with four flashing lights on cantilever arms above the
crossing, and with a bell.

All of these devices were seen,

functioning properly, at the time of the accident in ques·
tion by at least one witness apiece.

Appellant makes no

effort to controvert any of these facts.
The approaching train rang its bell and blew i~
whistle from a distance in excess of a quarter mile from
the crossing, and all the way through the crossing.
h

whistle was perceived by numerous witnesses when t e
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The

train

was at varying distances from the crossing, depending upon
the attentiveness of the witness and his position in relationship to the train.
One witness, Michael Peterson, testified that he
could not recall hearing the whistle from his position in the
yard of a nearby house.

At another point, however, he testi-

fied that he had heard the whistle.

(Tr. p. 19.)

He also

testified that he'd lived in the house for several years, and
had grown accustomed to frequent train whistles, so that he
often ignored the whistle as the train went by.

(Tr. p. 20.)

He testified, in effect, that he simply wasn't paying attention to the whistle on this occasion.

(Tr. pp. 19-20.)

Two ladies, Mrs. Nelson and Mrs. Wagstaff, crossed
the intersection in a car going West just before the accident.
Their testimony indicates that the whistle of the train startled them just as their car reached the tracks and the train
was perhaps 300 feet from the crossing.

(Tr. pp. 23, 25, 33.)

The testimony of other witnesses, however, clearly establishes,
and appellant does not here dispute, that at that moment the
flasher devices above and beside the crossing were flashing
and the bell at the crossing was ringing.

Mrs. Nelson and

Mrs. Wagstaff were apparently completely oblivious to these
indications of the approach of the train.

(Tr. pp. 29, 37.)

With respect to these ladies, it seems an inescapable conclusion that they simply were not paying attention as the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-3administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

situation demanded.

The ladies, in any case, each testifk

that they had not been paying attention to the whistle.
(Tr. pp. 29, 37.)
A gas station owner, at a station about as distar.:
from the crossing as the Peterson house, testified by depos:
tion that he would prefer not to guess how long he heard

t:1:

whistle, but, if forced to, would guess substantially in
excess of 5 seconds.
19.)

(Deposition of Allan Karas, pp. 17,:

He heard the whistle just before he got under a truer

to repair it; he then got under the truck.

The whistle bl:.

a full five seconds while he was under the truck.

He thouc·

the whistle had stopped for some time before the accident.
(Deposition p. 19.)

By any reasonable estimation, this plai

the train at the time of the whistle heard by Karas several
hundred feet further back from the crossing than the 300 f:•
contended by appellant.
Highway Patrol Officer Richard Mattingly testifii
that he was stopped, just before the accident, giving a tic·
to a motorist, on a freeway parallel to the railroad track;
As the train passed his patrol car, it was (by subsequent
measurement) 4/10 of a mile from the crossing, and Officer
Mattingly heard the whistle blow at that point.

(Tr. P· l·:

The train's engineer testified unequivocallY tha:
he blew the whistle at least a quarter of a mile from the
crossing.

(Tr. p. 52.)

He also testified that he

bl~~
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standard pattern of whistles:
a long."

(Tr. p. 52.)

"two longs, a short, and

It seems apparent that some of the

witnesses heard only the last long blast, while some heard
the entire whistle.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE
TRAIN WHISTLE BE BLOWN "AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH MILE
BEFORE REACHING" A CROSSING, AND MAKES THE RAILROAD LIABLE ONLY FOR SUCH DAMAGE AS RESULTS FROM
FAILURE SO TO BLOW THE WHISTLE.
The statute relied upon by plaintiff herein,
§56-1-14, U.C.A.

(1953), provides in pertinent part as

follows:
Every locomotive shall be provided
with a bell which shall be rung continuously from a point not less than eighty
rods from any city or town street or public highway grade crossing until such city
or town street or public highway grade
crossing shall be crossed, but, except in
towns and at terminal points, the sounding
of the locomotive whistle or siren at least
one-fourth of a mile before reaching any
such grade crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid;
during the prevalence of fogs, snow and
dust storms, the locomotive whistle shall
be sounded before each street crossing
while passing through cities and towns ..•
Every person in charge of a locomotive
violating the provisions of this se~tion is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and the ra~lroad .
company shall be liable for all damages wh~ch
any person may sustain by reason of such v~o
lation.
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There is no contention here that the train in
question was "in town" or at a terminal point.

Thus the

requirement of the statute was that the locomotive ring
its bell continuously from 80 rods before the crossing
until it was through the crossing,

~that

it sound its

whistle at least 1/4 mile before the crossing.
tle need not be blown continuously:
quirement applies to the bell.

The whis-

the continuous re-

The whistle need not be

sounded at precisely 1/4 mile from the crossing.

Any

distance 1/4 mile or more satisfies the statute.

Moreover

it is obvious that the statute does not make the railroad
liable, as appellant seems to suppose, for any damage whic.·
follows a failure to blow the whistle in strict accordance
with the statute.

The railroad is liable under the statut:

only for such damage as would not have occurred except for
the failure to blow the whistle.
It is readily apparent in this case both that tl:i
whistle was blown at least l/4 mile from the crossing, and
that the sounding of the whistle had no causative connecti:
to the collision that occurred.
POINT II.
THE ONLY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IS THAT THE WHISTLE
SOUNDED AT LEAST 1/4 MILE F'ROl-1 THE CROSSING.
Appellant's presentation in the District court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State Library.
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simply ignored the ancient distinction between negative
and positive testimony, and the rule that negative testimony is insufficient even to raise a conflict with
positive testimony so as to require submission of the
issue to a jury.

Appellant's brief attempts to cure

this defect ex post facto.
Positive testimony is the testimony of a witness that he observed a thing to occur.

Negative testi-

mony is testimony that the witness did not observe whether a thing occurred, or does not know, or does not recall
whether a thing occurred.

The testimony of witnesses,

such as Mr. Peterson, Mrs. Wagstaff and Mrs. Nelson in
this case, that they don't recall a whistle, though it
may have blown without their hearing it, or that they
heard the whistle at a particular point, but do not know
whether it blew earlier, is simply negative testimony
about whether the whistle was blown earlier or for longer
than the witnesses heard it.

The testimony of the train

engineer that he blew the whistle at least a quarter mile
from the crossing, and the testimony of the Highway Patrol
Officer that he heard the whistle blow a measured distance
of 4/10 of a mile from the crossing is positive testimony.
In the face of the positive testimony, the negative testimony must be wholly discounted and cannot sustain a
verdict.

~,

Hudson v. union Pacific Railroad Company,
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120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357 (1951); Anderson v. Union Pacif;
Railroad Company, 76 Utah 324, 289 P. 146,

(1930); Jensen,
~

Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 59 Utah 367, 204 P.
(1922).

101

For that reason, the only credible evidence ~ ~u

case on the question whether the train whistle was blown i;
accordance with the statute was testimony that it was in f:
so blown.

There was simply no question on this point to gc

to the jury.
To have created a jury issue in this case, appell
would have had to ascertain that the witnesses he relies uc
were not only in a position to hear, but listened for a whr
tle and did not hear one.

This was not done.

Each, in iac·

testified that he or she was not listening, or not 5>aying
attention.

The testimony of these witnesses is therefore

negative testimony, and must be discounted.

The cases cit:

above clearly demonstrate the rule.
In Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company,
supra, plaintiff's witness Priest testified that he was ne;:
plaintiff's deceased at the time he was struck by the tra~
but that he did not hear the train's whistle.
at the time was on another train.

His attentic

The crew of the train ir

valved in the collision testified that the whistle had beer
blown properly.

The Utah Supreme Court said:

"In view of all these circumstances and
conditions, it cannot be contended that
the testimony of the witness Priest to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the effect that he did not hear the bell
ring or the whistle blow can be considered
as evidence at all that the bell did not
ring or the whistle did not blow.
59 Utah at 376.
In Anderson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
supra, two witnesses, including the train engineer, testified that the whistle was properly blown before the accident, and two witnesses who were in the vicinity testified
that they did not hear a whistle.

The Utah Supreme Court

said at § 79 Utah 331:

'

The foregoing is, in substance, all
of the testimony touching the question of
the claimed negligence of the defendant in
failing to sound the whistle and ring the
bell as the train approached the point of
the accident.
Upon this evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to go to the jury on
such questions. The testimony of a witness
which is merely to the effect that he did
not hear a whistle blown or a bell rung is
not sufficient to overcome positive and direct testimony that the whistle was sounded
and the bell rung.
To entitle negative testimony such as that of Redden and Thompson
affecting the ringing of the bell and the
blowing of the whistle on the occasion in
question to any probative value, it must
be made to appear that they were paying
some attention to what actually occurred
and that they were in a position where they
could and did observe what was done or what
was not done. Clark v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (Utah) 257 P. 1050, and cases
there cited.
Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, is to
the same effect, except that the court there found that
the
witness
was Law
in Library.
a position
to provided
hear,by the
and
was
directing
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Funding for digitization
Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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her attention to the sound, but heard nothing.
Appellant claims in this case that Mrs. Wagstaff
and Mrs. Nelson come within the exception for witnesses whc
are in a position to hear and are paying attention, but do
not hear.

Appellant wishes to create the impression that

these women saw the train and directed their attention to
it because of the risk it represented to them, but that the.
heard no whistle until sometime later when the train was v;:
close.

Their testimony is more to the effect that they wer,

frightened and distracted by the sight of the train, and pa.
no attention to any other signals.

(Tr. pp. 24-29, 33-37.)

For example, though the evidence is ample that the crossin:
lights were flashing and the crossing bell was ringing, the
women perceived neither.

The conclusion is inescapable thr

they were paying attention to something else, if they were
paying attention to anything.
The cases cited by appellant are readily distin·
guished from the quotations in appellant's brief.

In ~

v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 9 Utah 141, 33 P. 626, (18~;
cited at page 6 of appellant's brief, the Court is at pain:
to point out that "The plaintiff testified that he look~
and listened for the train; that no whistle was sounded, a:
no bell was rung, in approaching the crossing.

Walters··

swears to substantially the same thing," and that none of

sror

defendant's witnesses claimed that the bell was rung. ~
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in short, was a case in which there was positive testimony that the bell was not rung, and no testimony at all
that it was rung.

It has no bearing on the present case.

Haun v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 22 Utah 346,
62 P. 908 (1900), cited at page 7 of appellant's brief, is
to the same effect, and equally inapplicable, in that the
Court there carefully points out that plaintiff's witnesses
testified that they "were in view of the place of the accident, and in a position where they could easily see and
hear what transpired," and "that they neither saw nor
heard the whistle or the bell, that their hearing was good,
and that their attention was directed to the approach of
the train, and as to whether the whistle was blown and the
bell rung."
Appellant in this case simply did not ask any of
his witnesses whether their attention was directed to the
approach of the train and the sounding of the whistle before
they heard the whistle blow, so as to eliminate the possibility that they were not paying attention and that the
whistle was blowing without their hearing it.

Respondent,

on the other hand, carefully asked each of these witnesses
whether or not it was possible that the whistle was blowing
before they heard it.

Each agreed that it was possible.

The testimony of these witnesses was negative testimony
only, and not entitled to go to the jury.
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POINT III.
THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED WHISTLE WAS BLOWN.
It is evident that appellant 1 s witnesses could
not and would not testify that the train's whistle was not
blown at least a quarter mile from the crossing.
their testimony tend to indicate such a thing.

Nor does
I t is sim·

ply that they heard, or didn 1 t hear, the whistle at a point
near the crossing, and cannot say whether it blew further
up the track.
The engineer and the Highway Patrol Officer couE
and did say that the whistle was blown at least a quarter
mile before the crossing.

Appellant seems to contend that

since the officer heard the whistle at 4/10 of a mile fioo
the crossing, and did not testify that he heard it at pre·
cisely 1/4 mile back, his testimony does not indicate com·
pliance with the statute.

The requirement, however, is

that the whistle be blown "at least one quarter mile" back,
Four tenths of a mile clearly will do.

The statute was

satisfied.
POINT IV.
THE ALLEGED FAILURE PROPERLY TO BLOW THE WHISTLE
HAD NO EFFECT UPON ANY DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF.
Even viewing the evidence about the train whistle
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided -12by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is obvious
that the alleged failure to blow the whistle at 1/4 mile
from the crossing could have had no causative effect upon
the collision that occurred.
The positive aspect of the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses is that the train blew its whistle when
it was approximately 300 feet from the crossing.

It is

undisputed in this case that 90th South, on which plaintiff was traveling, crosses the tracks at right angles,
that the train and truck were going the same speed, 50 m.p.h.,
and that the front of the train was 72 feet through the crossing when the truck struck it.

Thus, it is evident that, from

the time these witnesses say the train blew its whistle until
the time of the collision, the train traveled at least 372
feet (300 feet to the crossing, and 72 feet through it).
The truck, traveling at the same speed and at right angles
would have gone the same distance, 372 feet, from the sounding of the whistle to the collision.

Under our law, it is

presumed that a motorist sees and hears what is seen and
heard by others in the vicinity with a like opportunity to
perceive.

E.g., Wilson v. oregon Short Line Railroad Company,

35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466 (1909); Nuttall v. Denver and Rio
Grande Railroad Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P.2d 15 (1940);
Nabrotzky v.

s.

L. & utah R. Co., 103 Utah 274, 135 P.2d 115,

(1943).
It must be presumed, then, that, regardless of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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whether or not he heard a train whistle blown when the
train was a quarter mile from the crossing, plaintiff, 5
driver heard the train whistle when the truck he was
driving was approximately 372 feet from the crossing.
Plaintiff's accident reconstructionist testified that
at 30 m.p.h. the truck could readily have been stopped
in 144 feet (Tr. pp. 45, 48.), and the accident avoided.
While there was no testimony directly on point, it seems
obvious that at 50 m.p.h. the truck could have stopped
in 372 feet.
The only rational construction of the evidence
presented in this case is that the collision occurred
because the driver of the truck ignored all of the signals of the approach of the train -- the pavement markings,
the signs, the roadside flashers, the overhead flashers,
the bell, and the train whistle.

The train whistle wu

blown, even according to the testimony of appellant's wit·
nesses as appellant construes it, in ample time for the
driver to avoid the accident.

It cannot be claimed in

that circumstance that any failure to blow the whistle
even earlier caused any damage to appellant.
CONCLUSIONS

.
· f or reversal
Appellant subm1ts
as the sole bas1s
the contention that a jury in this matter might properlY
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have found that respondent's train did not blow its whistle 1/4 mile back from the crossing in question, and that
as a result appellant was damaged.

The only positive

evidence on the point, however, is the testimony of the
train engineer and the Highway Patrol Officer that the
whistle was blown at least a quarter mile in advance of
the crossing.

Thus sounding the whistle clearly satifies

the applicable statute, §56-1-14, U.C.A.

(1953).

The

negative inferences to be drawn from the testimony of
appellant's witnesses that they heard the whistle at a
different point do not even create a conflict in the evidence.

There was, therefore, nothing on this point to

submit to the jury.

Even if this were not so, it is evi-

dent that reasonable minds could only conclude that sounding the whistle even as appellant claims it was sounded in
this case, had no causal effect upon any damages sustained
by plaintiff, and creates no liability in the railroad

under §56-1-14.
_: ......
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day of August,

1977.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
& McCARTHY/
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E. Craig Smay
Attorney for Respondents
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